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Abstract 
Fire barriers, and physical separation are key components in managing the fire risk in Nuclear 
Facilities. The expected performance of these features have often been predicted using rules-of-
thumb or expert judgment. These approaches often lack the convincing technical bases that exist 
when addressing other Nuclear Facility accident events. This paper presents science-based 
approaches to demonstrate the effectiveness of fire separation methods. 
Introduction 
Fire barriers and fire walls are a common feature of industrial facilities. Usually they are 
installed to meet prescriptive life safety and monetary protection requirements which differ 
substantially from the nuclear safety objective to limit radiological releases. The barrier 
evaluation method presented in this paper is appropriate for use in a variety of safety analysis 
applications where a quantitative understanding of fire barrier performance is desired. The ability 
to compare, quantitatively, fire barrier capacity to the expected fire demand consistant with 
actual facility operations, permits a better understanding of the facility safety margin. This better 
understanding can be a significant contribution to the process of appropriate safety control 
definition with the greatest possible of operating flexibility 
Standoffs and physical separation are often used to limit fire propagation inside or between 
buildings. Typically, thermal radiation theory is used to establish the minimum physical 
separation between a fire and the target to prevent ignition. Two widely-used analytical 
approaches are compared in this paper. The predictions obtained using the two approaches have 
been compared and shown to be consistent. In the process, the technical bases for each approach 
has been reviewed and the safety margin better clarified.   
This paper will discuss two separate fire propagation prevention methods (barriers and physical 
separation) and evaluation techniques to judge their expected performance. There are other fire 
propagation mechanisms that should be considered in a comprehensive hazard evaluation (e.g., 
branding, vertical propagation from window to window around a barrier, rocketing of burning 
cylinders or tanks around or through a barrier, convective propagation of flammable gases 
through ventilation systems or corridors, propagation along a roof over a barrier, movement of 
adjacent structural members that damages a barrier).  Discussion of these mechanisms is 
considered beyond the scope of this paper. 
Fire Barrier Performance 
DOE Order 420.1B, Facility Safety1 establishes the need for fire separation through the 
requirement to limit the Maximum Possible Fire Loss (MPFL) to specifically defined limits. 
These limits are established in DOE G 440.1-5, Implementation Guide for use with DOE Orders 
420.1 and 440.1 Fire Safety Program2 and DOE-STD-1066-99, DOE Standard Fire Protection 
Design Criteria.3  These documents prescribe a minimum 2-hour fire rating for fire areas. The 
documents do not establish or recommend an analytical approach to judge if a greater fire 
resistance is required. The documents do require that in computing the MPFL “failure of both 
automatic fire suppression systems and manual fire fighting efforts” must be assumed.3 As such, 
there is an implicit risk assumption associated with the use of the 2 hour rating that considers the 
existence of automatic suppression and fire department intervention. 
Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs) for Category 2 and 3 Nuclear Facilities are typically 
prepared using the safe harbor approach established in DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide 
for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis.4 A key 
consideration in the 3009 approach is the explicit identification of the engineered features and 
administrative controls that provide assurance that the facility may be operated safely. Since the 
2-hour minimum rating contains an implicit risk acceptance for monetary protection, there will 
be facilities where the minimum rating might not be appropriate for the protection of the public 
or workers from radioactive contamination spread. 
There are two basic categories of horizontal fire separation: Fire barrier walls and fire walls.5 
Fire barrier walls are intended to impede the spread of fire, usually to provide occupants 
sufficient time to exit the facility. They are not intended to remain in place following fire 
extinguishment. Fire walls are designed to resist fire spread and remain in place following fire 
extinguishment. While the nomenclature for vertical fire separation (i.e., floors, ceilings and 
roofs) is not as explicit, the functionality is similar.  
The most commonly used fire barrier qualification test is ASTM E-119, Standard Test Methods for 
Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials.6 This test, which is used to qualify both fire 
barrier walls and fire walls, subjects the fire barrier to a specific time-temperature furnace 
exposure. The primary ASTM E-119 failure criterion is a rise in the temperature on the 
unexposed surface of more than 139°C (250°F) above the initial barrier temperature, although 
excessive flame penetration or loss of structural integrity are also failure criteria evaluated in the 
test. The test is considered to provide a good metric to compare the capabilities of different 
barrier designs; however, the test is limited to a single time-temperature insult, which is not 
necessarily the most demanding fire. Specific facility arrangements and fire loadings may create 
fires that are more demanding than the ASTM test. 
A common technique to account for alternate fire severities was developed in the early 1920s 
based on testing by Ingberg.7 Table 1 shows the equivalent fire severity for given wood 
equivalent fire loading. (Nominally taken as 8,000 Btu per pound wood).  Based on this table, a 
building with a 10-psf loading would be expected to have an equivalent fire severity of 1 hour. 
Care must be taken when using the units of “hours” to report fire severity.  The fire severity is 
sometimes confused with fire duration.  The situation is analogous to pounds-force and pounds-
mass in the U.S. customary units.  In some applications the adoption of d and s subscripts might 
be appropriate (duration and severity).   
Table 1.--Fire intensity and duration. 
 
Wood equivalent  
combustible loading 
psf Btu/ft2 kg/m2 
Fire severity7 
Hours 
 
E-119 temperature at the specified 
time6,°C 
5 40,000 24 0.5 843 
10 80,000 49 1 927 
15 120,000 73 1.5 985 
20 160,000 98 2 1010 
30 240,000 146 3 1052 
40 320,000 195 4.5 1121 
50 380,000 244 7 1218 
60 432,000 293 8 1260 
70 500,000 342 9 1260 
 
Harmathy8 established a methodology to calculate the fire resistance requirements (i.e., fire 
severity demand) for a specific failure probability based on the normalized heat load: 
∫=
τ
0
d dt q
c ρk 
1H  
where k is the thermal conductivity of wall [J/m·K]; c is the heat capacity of wall [J/kg·K]; ρ is 
the density of wall [kg/m3];  q is the heat flux to a wall [W/m2]; t is the time [s].  For a typical 
wall construction (e.g., concrete, gypsum) heat load capacity was demonstrated to be: 
( )6.1529.4176.92τ10H s4c −+=  
where the fire rating of the wall, τs, is in units of hour-severity based on the ASTM E-119 curve. 
The normalized heat load capacity, Hc; and the normalized heat load demand, Hd; may be used to 
estimate barrier failure probability, Pf; based on the inverse standard normal distribution function 
of failure parameter β.9 
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where:   Ω1  is the coefficient of variation for the heat load demand, Hd 
 Ω2  is the coefficient of variation for the heat load capacity, Hc 
 Ω3  is the coefficient of variation for error. 
A value of 0.101 has been estimated for the variation in error, Ω3, and a value of 0.09 for the 
variation associated with capacity, Ω2.9 For simplicity, the variation associated with demand, Ω1, 
may be neglected (i.e., set to zero), effectively considering constant combustible load conditions 
at the maximum level.   
Thus, normalized heat load capacity, Hc, can be estimated for a specific wall construction, based 
on the ASTM E-119 rating (e.g., 2 hours). The normalized heat load demand, Hd, may be 
estimated using a fire model that predicts the heat flux on the target wall.  The failure probability 
for the target wall can then be estimated from: 
Pf = 1 - NormalStandard Distribution (β) 
Figure 1 presents the heat flux predictions to a gypsum wall during a serious fire in a Nuclear 
Facility at the Savannah River Site,10 which was generated from a CFAST fire model.  The fire 
compartment is a large (30,000 ft2, with a 12.5 ft height) unsprinklered concrete structure.  The 
gypsum wall represents the perimeter of a small room within the fire compartment.  The 
combustible loading was approximately 16,000 pounds wood equivalent.  The flux predictions 
assume that the fire will be ventilation limited, intervention by the fire department will not occur, 
and a limited-combustible zone is established near the gypsum wall (about 20’ wide).  The 
limited-combustible zone was established to kept the high heat flux period shown Figure 1 to 
about 30 minutes.   
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Figure 1, Heat flux to wall during a postulated fire 
 
The probability of target wall failure for the given heat flux demand is developed in Table 2, 
based on a thermal absorbtivity (kρc)0.5 for the target wall of 374 W·s0.5/m2K, which is a common 
value for gypsum walls.9 Predictions are presented for 2, 3 and 4 hour construction.  If the fire is 
extinguished at about 2 hours (first bold row), the probability of fire barrier failure is negligible 
for all three constructions.  If the fire is extinguished at 4 hours (second bold row), the 
probability of failure for the 2 hour barrier is 62 percent.  The probability of the 3 and 4 hour 
constructions are small (3 percent and 0 percent).  At 6 hours, the respective probabilities are 99, 
55 and 8 percent.  Beyond this duration, the probabilities for any construction are undesirable.  In 
terms of a safety basis strategy it is clear that 2 hour construction will require some form of 
intervention (e.g., manual fire control). To prevent barrier failure for a 2-hour wall at a 90 
percent confidence, suppression will need to occur before 2.8 hours after ignition.   
Table 2 – Energy estimates. 
2 hour barrier 3 hour barrier 4 hour barrier 
Time 
Energy absorption by 
wall Hc = 73,870 Hc = 99,798 Hc = 122,100 
sec hrs 
Fire 
flux  
W/m2 delta cumulative 
Hd 
s1/2·K β Pfail β Pfail β Pfail 
0 0.00 0.0 1,937,258 1,937,258 5,180 19.64 0.00 21.87 0.00 23.36 0.00 
500 0.14 9.7 3,280,345 5,217,603 13,951 12.32 0.00 14.54 0.00 16.04 0.00 
1000 0.28 7.4 2,181,495 7,399,098 19,784 9.74 0.00 11.96 0.00 13.45 0.00 
1500 0.42 5.4 1,103,410 8,502,508 22,734 8.71 0.00 10.93 0.00 12.43 0.00 
2000 0.56 1.3 1,219,355 9,721,863 25,994 7.72 0.00 9.94 0.00 11.44 0.00 
3000 0.83 1.7 1,383,375 11,105,238 29,693 6.74 0.00 8.96 0.00 10.45 0.00 
4000 1.11 1.7 1,242,040 12,347,278 33,014 5.95 0.00 8.18 0.00 9.67 0.00 
5000 1.39 1.3 1,349,955 13,697,233 36,624 5.19 0.00 7.41 0.00 8.90 0.00 
6000 1.67 1.9 1,613,400 15,310,633 40,938 4.36 0.00 6.59 0.00 8.08 0.00 
7000 1.94 1.9 1,632,055 16,942,688 45,301 3.61 0.00 5.84 0.00 7.33 0.00 
8000 2.22 2.0 1,824,315 18,767,003 50,179 2.86 0.00 5.08 0.00 6.57 0.00 
9000 2.50 2.4 1,949,685 20,716,688 55,392 2.13 0.02 4.35 0.00 5.84 0.00 
10000 2.78 2.3 1,887,400 22,604,088 60,439 1.48 0.07 3.71 0.00 5.20 0.00 
11000 3.06 2.3 1,679,760 24,283,848 64,930 0.95 0.17 3.18 0.00 4.67 0.00 
12000 3.33 1.8 1,481,150 25,764,998 68,890 0.52 0.30 2.74 0.00 4.23 0.00 
13000 3.61 1.8 1,491,720 27,256,718 72,879 0.10 0.46 2.32 0.01 3.81 0.00 
14000 3.89 1.8 1,505,245 28,761,963 76,904 -0.30 0.62 1.93 0.03 3.42 0.00 
15000 4.17 1.8 1,521,105 30,283,068 80,971 -0.68 0.75 1.55 0.06 3.04 0.00 
16000 4.44 1.8 1,538,580 31,821,648 85,085 -1.04 0.85 1.18 0.12 2.67 0.00 
17000 4.72 1.9 1,557,180 33,378,828 89,248 -1.40 0.92 0.83 0.20 2.32 0.01 
18000 5.00 1.9 1,576,525 34,955,353 93,464 -1.74 0.96 0.48 0.31 1.98 0.02 
19000 5.28 1.9 1,237,595 36,192,948 96,773 -2.00 0.98 0.23 0.41 1.72 0.04 
20000 5.56 1.1 874,123 37,067,070 99,110 -2.17 0.99 0.05 0.48 1.54 0.06 
21000 5.83 1.0 847,886 37,914,956 101,377 -2.34 0.99 -0.12 0.55 1.37 0.08 
22000 6.11 1.0 826,051 38,741,007 103,586 -2.50 0.99 -0.28 0.61 1.22 0.11 
23000 6.39 1.0 807,448 39,548,455 105,745 -2.65 1.00 -0.43 0.67 1.06 0.14 
24000 6.67 1.0 792,376 40,340,831 107,863 -2.80 1.00 -0.57 0.72 0.92 0.18 
25000 6.94 0.9 779,865 41,120,695 109,948 -2.94 1.00 -0.72 0.76 0.77 0.22 
26000 7.22 0.9 769,255 41,889,950 112,005 -3.08 1.00 -0.85 0.80 0.64 0.26 
27000 7.50 0.9 381,082 42,271,032 113,024 -3.14 1.00 -0.92 0.82 0.57 0.28 
 
As discussed earlier the minimum acceptable fire separation for monetary protection in the DOE 
complex is 2 hours. Outside of the DOE community it is common to provide ratings of 4 hours 
or greater where there is significant potential for large monetary losses.11 The primary 
justification for this difference is the strong reliance on good conduct of operations within the 
DOE community, when compared to general industry. The results in Table 2 validate this safety 
posture, if sufficient fire department capabilities are available. 
Standoff Required to Prevent Ignition 
There are two National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) guidance documents that can be 
used in developing standoff and separation estimates:  NFPA 80A, Recommended Practice for 
Protection of Buildings from Exterior Fire Exposures,12 and NFPA 555, Guide on Methods for 
Evaluating Potential for Room Flashover.13  Typically, the former is used for exterior building-
to-building propagation, while the later is uses for interior package-to-package propagation.  The 
predictions obtained using the two approaches have been compared and shown to be consistent.  
In the process the technical bases for each approach has been reviewed and the safety margin 
better clarified.   
The fuel packages considered in this evaluation were industrial trailers typical of those 
containing analytical equipment in exterior material storage facilities. They were comprised of a 
sheet metal exterior with various combustible and non-combustible interior components (e.g., 
combustible frames and vinyl interior partitions, ceilings, and floors). The trailer include tires but 
no tractor unit. The approximate weight of each unit was between 48,000 and 60,000 pounds. 
The nominal trailer dimensions were 8’ (2.4 meters) wide, 46’ (14 meters) long, and 12.8’ (3.9 
meters) high.  While detailed combustible representations of the trailers was not developed, the 
heat release rate (HRR) if the trailers were to become fully involved was judged to be in the 
range of 10 MW to 50 MW.14  
Standoff Based on NFPA 80A 
Using the method proposed by NFPA 80A, the standoff distance, S, required for exposure from a 
building of greater or equal height may be estimated as: 
 
NGZS +×=  
where: Z is the lesser value of building width (W) or height (H) 
 G is the guide number [unitless] 
 N  opening protection factor [feet] 
The guide number, G, is determined based on fire severity, the percentage of opening in the 
exposing wall area, and the building exposure face configuration defined as the larger of the 
width versus height or height versus width ratios. NFPA 80A defines three levels of fire severity 
(light, moderate, severe) based on the average combustible load per unit of floor area and the 
characteristics and average flame spread ratings of the interior wall and ceiling finishes. Because 
the exterior walls of the trailers were not expected to withstand fire penetration in excess of 20 
minutes, the percentage of openings in the exposing wall area was taken to be 100% as 
recommended in NFPA 80A.  The building exposure configuration is defined as the larger of the 
width versus height (W/H) or height versus width (H/W) ratio of the exposing building. 
The opening protection factor, N is an additive factor of 5 feet that is included for cases were the 
openings are not equipped with protective features having a fire protection rating equal to or 
greater than the expected duration of the fire.  Following the NFPA 80A method, the standoff 
distance required for the inherent heat flux ignition threshold of 12.5 kW/m2 is presented in Table 
3. Qualitative consideration of the generic trailer selected for this evaluation suggests that it 
would be most realistically represented by the severe fire classification defined in NFPA 80A. 
Table 3 – Standoff to Trailer Required by NFPA 80A. 
 
 
Severity 
Lesser of 
trailer 
length or 
height G 
Recommended 
standoff 
 
 feet unitless feet meters 
Light 12.8 2.44 36.3 11.1 
Moderate 12.8 3.74 52.8 16.1 
Severe 12.8 5.48 75.1 22.9 
 
Standoff Based on NFPA 555 
Radiant heat flux to a target from a fuel package is described in NFPA 555 as the product of 
emissive power (E) and a view factor. The emissive power will vary with the size of the fire and 
type of material involved in the fire. The view factor, which defines the fraction of thermal 
radiation leaving an emitting surface and intercepted by a target surface, is defined based on the 
geometric arrangement of surfaces. 
The emissive power, E, of a fire may be estimated based on the Shokri and Beyler correlation 
D00823.01058E −×=  
where D equivalent fire diameter [m].  The fire diameter may be estimated as: 
( )( )
m 6.5
pi
m 2.4m 144
pi
4AD ===  
where A is the footprint area of the fire [m2].  The resulting emissive power is 51.3 kW/m2. 
The view factor, Fv, for an elemental area representing the target may be estimated by treating 
the fire as a flat plate.  The view factor for an elemental area to a plane parallel rectangular where 
the normal to the element passes through the corner of the rectangle is:15 
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where: X = a/c, Y = b/c (See Figure 2.) 
 Figure 2, Configuration factor nomenclature for plate and elemental area 
 
For the burning trailer, the plane width may be equated to half the trailer width, the fire height 
was used to establish half the plane height. (The halves occur because the view factor geometry 
shown in Figure 2 represents a quarter of the fire surface.)  The fire height may be approximated 
based on the equivalent fire diameter and the fire HRR. Due to the potential variation in actual 
HRR, a parametric solution is appropriate in which the peak HRR (q) ranges from 10 MW to 
50 MW. The associated fire height is then predicted as  
1.02D0.235qH 2/5 −=  
The standoff distance, c, may then be calculated for a desired heat flux threshold value based on 
the view factor relationship and the heat flux estimate: 
FEq ⋅=  
Established practice16 for heat flux calculations estimated using the Shokri and Beyler correlation 
is to include a safety factor of 2, which is applied to the estimated standoff distance. Thus, the 
calculated value of standoff distance should be doubled.  For the evaluated trailer, the standoff 
distance required by NFPA 555 for a heat flux ignition threshold of 12.5 kW/m2 is presented in 
Table 4.  This table was iteratively developed by adjusting the standoff distance until the desired 
heat flux was obtained. 
Table 4 – Standoff required by NFPA 555 for 12.5 kW/m2 Ignition Threshold. 
Standoff, c 
With SF* 
No 
SF* 
geometry constants 
meters 
geometry 
constants, 
unitless HRR 
MW 
Fire 
height, 
H 
meters feet meters meters a b c X Y ftotal 
heat 
flux 
kW/m2 
10 2.7 31.9 9.7 4.9 1.35 7 4.86 0.28 1.44 0.244 12.5 
20 5.7 54.6 16.6 8.3 2.85 7 8.32 0.34 0.84 0.244 12.5 
40 9.7 74.9 22.8 11.4 4.85 7 11.4 0.43 0.61 0.244 12.5 
*Safety factor 
Comparison of Standoff Results 
For the defined trailers the fire severity was judged to be severe, the required standoff computed 
using NFPA 80A was 75.1 feet.  For the 40 MW fire, which is judged to be sufficiently 
conservative for the trailers involved, the required standoff computed using NPFA 555 is 74.9 
feet.  These two results are considered sufficiently close to validate that either result could be 
established as the safety basis standoff to prevent fire propagation.  
a 
c 
b A2 
dA
Table 5 presents the required standoff distances based on NFPA 80A, and the HRR estimate 
necessary to obtain the same standoff distance using the method proposed in NFPA 555.  Based 
on this, it appears reasonable to equate low fire severity with a 10 MW fire, and a severe fire 
with a 40 MW fire.  The moderate fire severity is best equated with a 20 MW fire.   
Table 5 – NFPA 80A to NFPA 555 Correlation. 
NFPA 80A standoff 
from Table 3 
NFPA 555 predicted HRR 
to achieve a heat flux of 
12.5 kW/m2 Exposure 
Severity feet meters MW 
Low 36.3 11.1 11 
Moderate 52.8 16.1 19 
Severe 75.1 22.9 41 
Conclusion 
Quantitative analysis approaches have been presented to permit the evaluation of fire barrier 
capabilities and fire standoff distances.  Such methods, when used, can provide reproducible 
substantiation for fire controls intended to limit fire spread.  In addition, by quantifying the key 
parameters associated with preventing fire propagation, the importance specific parameters can 
be better understood.  Such an understanding can then be used to better tailor the controls 
strategies to specific operational objectives. 
Works Cited 
 
1  Facility Safety.  2005.  Washington, DC:  Department of Energy.  DOE Order 420.1B 
2  Implementation Guide for use with DOE Orders 420.1 and 440.1 Fire Safety Program.  
1995.  Washington, DC:  Department of Energy.  (30 September).  DOE G 440.1-5 (also 
known as DOE G-420.1/B-0 & G-440.1/E-0). 
3  DOE Standard Fire Protection Design Criteria,  1999.  Washington, DC:  Department of 
Energy.  DOE-STD-1066-99 
4  Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility 
Documented Safety Analysis.  2002.  Washington, DC:  Department of Energy.  (April)  
DOE STD-3009-94. 
5  Standard for High Challenge Fire Walls, Fire Walls, and Fire Barrier Walls.  2006.  
Quincy, MA:  National Fire Protection Association.  NFPA 221. 
6  Standard Test Methods for Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials.  2000.  West 
Conshohocken, PA: , American Society of Testing and Metals, ASTM E-119. 
 
 7. Ingberg, S. H., “Tests of the Severity of Building Fires,” in Quarterly National Fire 
Protection Association, Vol. 22 (1928) pp 43-61. 
8  Harmathy, T. Z. and J. R. Mehaffey.  1982.  “Normalized Heat Load: A Key Parameter in 
Fire Safety Design” in  Fire and Materials: 6(1).  27-31. 
9  Coutts, D.A.  2004. Fire Barrier Effectiveness – The Likelihood That Building 
Construction Limits Fire Spread.  Aiken, SC: Washington Safety Management Solutions 
LLC.  WSRC-TR-2004-00409. 
10  Blanton, C. H., and D. A. Coutts.  2005.  Evaluation of Potential Fire Conditions in 105-L 
Disassembly Area.  Aiken, SC: Washington Safety Management Solutions LLC.  F-CLC-
L-00001. 
11  Criteria for Maximum Foreseeable loss Fire Walls and Space Separation.  2004.  
Norwood, MA:  FM Global.  (September)  FM 1-22. 
12  Recommended Practice for Protection of Buildings from Exterior Fire Exposures.  2007.  
Quincy, MA:  National Fire Protection Association.  NFPA 80A. 
13  Guide on Methods for Evaluating Potential for Room Flashover. 2004.  Quincy MA: 
National Fire Protection Association. NFPA 555. 
14  Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and Other Limited Access Highways.  2004.  Quincy, 
MA:  National Fire Protection Association.  NFPA 502. 
15. Siegel, Robert and John R. Howell.  1981.  Thermal Radiation Heat Transfer, 2nd Ed. 
Washington.  Hemisphere Publishing Corporation. 
16  Beyler, Craig L.  2002.  “Fire Hazard Calculations for Large Open Hydrocarbon Fires” in 
SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 3rd Ed.  Quincy, MA:  National Fire 
Protection Association.. 
